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CAREER CRIMINAL PROSECUTION: POTENTIAL OBJECTIVES
PETER W. GREENWOOD*
INTRODUCTION
The concept of career criminal programs, which
involves concentrating prosecutors' resources on
repeat offenders with serious criminal records, is
more than five years old. Federal, state, and local
officials have instituted more than fifty projects
utilizing federal or state Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Administration grants. These programs have
been immensely popular among practitioners and
the press. They are routinely praised as being one
of the most significant innovations that the LEAA
has produced to date. Nevertheless, when practi-
tioners take a hardheaded look at what these pro-
grams accomplish, they are uncertain about the
ultimate impact of the programs.
There is no confusion about career criminal
programs' immediate goals. Once the prosecutor
has specified his local definition of who is to be
considered a "career criminal," it is generally ac-
cepted that the program should strive for (1) in-
creased conviction rates and higher conviction
levels; (2) increased incarceration rates and longer
terms; (3) higher bail and increased use of pretrial
detention; and (4) speedier dispositions of cases.
The real issue is not whether these immediate
project goals are desirable, but whether their
achievement will reduce crime or otherwise aid
society in the long run.
The purpose of this article is to describe a num-
ber of career criminal programs' long-term objec-
tives. The article will demonstrate how the prose-
cutor's choice of ultimate objectives should influ-
ence such program decisions as the selection criteria
for including defendants in the program and trade-
offs in performance with other parts of the prose-
cutor's office. The three long-term objectives this
paper will consider are crime reduction, symbolic
justice, and improved office performance. The pa-
per will demonstrate how crime can be reduced
through incapacitation or deterrence, depending
on the screening criteria and the success of the
program in achieving its immediate goals. The
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paper will then argue that the program can fulfill
a valuable symbolic role for the community, re-
gardless of its ultimate effects on crime. Finally,
the paper will demonstrate how these programs
can lead to long-term improvements in the per-
formance of the prosecutor's office by introducing
or testing a host of innovations which later can be
adopted officewide without significant additional
costs.
CAREER CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AS A CRIME
REDUCTION TECHNIQUE
The career criminal is a one-man crime wave. If we can
bring him to a speedy trial, and make sure that, if found
guilty, he is sent back to prison, we can give the streets back
to the people. Our job is to put the career criminal out of
business.-President Gerald R. Ford'
Although the crime reduction effects of career
criminal programs may not be as dramatic as
President Ford predicted, the programs are ex-
pected to be effective. In fact, the failure of existing
projects to demonstrate perceptible impacts on
crime is one of the most critical issues faced by the
program to date. The two methods by which one
expects the programs to reduce crime are incapa-
citation and deterrence. The incapacitation effects
of the system are those crimes that the program
prevents by taking offenders out of the community
while they are incarcerated. The program prevents
the crimes that the career offender would have
committed if he had not been restrained.2 The
deterrent effects 3 of the system are the inhibiting
effects that sanctions have on potential offenders.
These are the crimes that would have occurred if
potential offenders knew that they would not be
punished.
In theory, increases in any one or combination
1 This statement was made by President Gerald R.
Ford in a speech before the International Association of
Chiefs of Police in 1974.
2 One model for calculating the amount of crimes
prevented involves calculating what fraction of the time
an offender will be incarcerated under a given sanction
policy and assuming that this fraction of crime will also
be prevented.
3 Analysts define special deterrence as applying only
to the offender who is sanctioned and general deterrence
as applying to all potential offenders.
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of conviction rates, incarceration rates, or sentence
lengths should increase deterrence and incapaci-
tation effects. However, this paper will examine
how a number of practical problems may affect
our ability to observe impacts on crime. These
practical problems include how conviction rates
are defined, the number of offenders handled by
the program, the selection criteria, the timing of
the crime effects, and the effects of the program on
other parts of the office. Prior to this examination,
this article will summarize the conclusions of a
recent study concerning the scientific evidence in
support of the incapacitation and deterrence the-
ories.
Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin examined evi-
dence substantiating both theories. They found:
Analyses of natural variation (in sanctions between
states), with few exceptions, find a negative associ-
ation between crime rates and non-capital sanction
risks.... [Alny conclusion that these negative asso-
ciations reflect a deterrent effect, however, is limited
principally by the inability to eliminate other fac-
tors that could account for the observed relation-
ship, even in the absence of a deterrent effect.... In
summary, therefore we cannot yet assert that the
evidence warrants an affirmative conclusion regard-
ing deterrence.
4
They found the evidence in support of the inca-
pacitation theory more compelling.
As long as there is a reasonable presumption that
offenders who are imprisoned would have continued
to commit crimes if they had remained free, there
is unquestionably a direct incapacitative effect.
Models exist for estimating the incapacitative
effect, but they rest on a number of important, and
as yet untested, assumptions. Using the models
requires adequate estimates of critical, but largely
unknown, parameters that characterize individual
criminal careers. The most basic parameters include
estimates of individual crime rates and of the length
of individual criminal careers as well as of the
distribution of both of these parameters across the
population of criminals.
5
In sum, research to date cannot assert unequi-
vocably that increases in sanctions will lead to
significant reductions in crime, although the evi-
dence points in that direction. Consequently one is
left to his own interpretations of the available
4 DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE
EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS OF CRIME RATES 6 (1978).
5 Id. at 9.
evidence to decide the magnitude of effects that
can be expected realistically.
A more practical problem is that many prose-
cutors interpret the conviction rate under a career
criminal program as the percentage of cases filed
by the unit that result in conviction. This definition
is inconsistent with incapacitation and deterrence
theories, which are concerned with the probability
that a crime will lead to conviction. By focusing on
only those cases filed by the prosecutor's office, the
impacts of case screening become confounded with
those of prosecution effectiveness. Specifically, if a
prosecutor increases his conviction rate through
tighter case screening without changing the prob-
ability of conviction given arrest, there will be no
deterrent or incapacitation effect.' For an incapa-
citation or deterrent effect to exist, the actual risk
of sanctions (conviction, incarceration, or sentence
length) associated with particular types of crime
must be increased.
Another problem is that the number of offenders
processed by a program may be so small that the
resulting incapacitation or deterrent effects on the
overall crime rate cannot be distinguished from
random fluctuations. Suppose that a program con-
centrates on adult robbers with prior felony con-
victions-a definition that might include about
20% of the robbery cases filed by the office. Further,
assume that the program is able to increase the
average time served for defendants under the pro-
gram by 25%-from four to five years. Finally,
assume that the average time served for all other
robbers, including those not convicted, is two years.
Under these conditions, the one year increase in
average time served for defendants under the pro-
gram translates to less than a 10% increase in the
average time served for all robbery defendants.
Based on the most recent models of incapacitation
effects, this increase in average sentence length
could be expected to reduce adult robberies by 3%
at most. It would not have any effect on juvenile
robberies, which may comprise 30% to 50% of the
total. One does not know what its deterrent effect
might be.
Furthermore, the reduction in crime resulting
from career criminal programs will not be observed
immediately. The deterrent effects will take some
time for potential offenders to adjust to the new
sanctions. The incapacitation effects will not be felt
6 Conversely, an evaluation that measures the convic-
tion rate, based on cases filed, will miss all of the benefits
of better police investigation and liaison work.
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until four or five years after the program's start,
which is when the extended terms for defendants
under the program would begin to take effect.
Finally, if an increase in program sanctions is
achieved at the expense of lower sanctions for other
defendants, because of more dismissals or greater
plea bargaining to reduce case backlogs, the overall
deterrent or incapacitation effects could be reduced
further.
These arguments are not presented to point out
the futility of attempting to reduce crime through
the career criminal program approach. Rather,
they are offered to explain why crime reduction
may not be observed immediately and why a pro-
gram ultimately must have a significant effect on
the jurisdiction's average sanction severity if crime
is to be affected. On a more optimistic note, the
size of the incapacitation effects resulting from the
program may be increased if prosecutors learn to
identify and focus on those defendants whose prior
records indicate that they will be the most active
in crime.
The selection criteria adopted by a program can
limit the program's impact. The principal benefit
that a career criminal program offers is more thor-
ough and effective prosecutions-a characteristic
that should result in higher conviction rates and
tougher sentences for marginal cases that would
not be prepared properly under routine procedures.
However, many programs exclude this type of case
from consideration. By concentrating on "sure-win-
ner" cases, for which the results of increased pros-
ecution effort may not be felt readily, prosecutors
may be limiting severely the amount of improve-
ment programs may achieve.
CAREER CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND SYMBOLIC
JUSTICE
Laws threaten, or promise, punishment for crimes. Society
has obligated itself by threatening. It owes the carrying out
of its threats. Society pays its debts by punishing the offender,
however unwilling he is to accept payment... Were they
not punished, those who did restrain themselves would feel
cheated.-Ernest van den Haag7
Most criminal courts undermine respect for law-not by
their results, but by the shabby, haphazard way in which
they are run.-Charles Silberman8
In this era of restricted local budgets, it is inevi-
table that the work load thrust upon the criminal
7 E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 15,21 (1975).
8 C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE; CRIMINALJUSTICE
256 (1978).
courts will far exceed their ability to dispose of
each case properly. Assembly-line processing and
nine-month backlogs were the norm even before
municipal governments discovered fiscal con-
straints. Aside from their budgetary problems,
criminal courts find themselves faced with a crisis
of self-doubt and lack of public confidence. Should
their emphasis be on punishment or on redemption
of the wrongdoer? Should all offenders be punished
according to their crime or is the best approach in
most cases radical nonintervention, as some label-
ing theorists would suggest? What evidence can
criminal courts and local governments give to the
public-and to victims in particular-that their
victimizations are taken seriously and that efforts
are made to protect them?
The career criminal program provides an answer
to some of these problems. By concentrating its
resources on a small group of defendants who have
repeatedly flouted society's rules-a group that
empirical studies have shown represents the highest
risk of recidivism-the criminal justice system has
a reasonable target for carrying out its symbolic
functions without undue concessions to haste or
expediency. The wide acclaim received by career
criminal programs to date is testimony to the fact
that they have the ability to convince both cynical
prosecutors and skeptical victims that the system
sometimes works. Programs may achieve these
benefits regardless of their effects upon crime. Fur-
thermore, by zealously prosecuting those who have
made a profession out of victimizing society, pro-
grams provide a visible expression of society's out-
rage at the career criminals' behavior and the
damage it has caused.
A SPUR TO INNOVATION
The most significant effects of career criminal
programs may not be their immediate impacts on
crime or victim perceptions but on the overall
functioning of the prosecutor's office. In many
cities, criminal prosecution procedures have be-
come stymied by the magnitude of growing case-
loads and increased procedural safeguards.
In many offices the instigation of program pro-
cedures has demonstrated that the prosecutor sys-
tematically can affect the outcome of cases.
Through the use of police liaison officers or the
early participation of prosecutors in complicated
investigations, the quality and responsiveness of
police work can be upgraded. Extra attention de-
voted to securing the cooperation of witnesses can
result in fewer dismissals or plea bargain conces-
19801
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sions. Sentence bargaining and charge bargaining
can be restricted without increasing trial rates.
Early case screening can avoid unproductive efforts
on marginal cases. The benefits of vertical repre-
sentation9 can be achieved without completely up-
setting the efficiency of an office. Case monitoring
can ensure that supervisors' policies are executed
and that important cases do not slip through
cracks. Criminal history systems can be made more
responsive so that the prosecutor is not forced to
make critical decisions without knowing the char-
acteristics of the defendants with whom he is deal-
ing.
In summary, the operation of career criminal
program units can provide a test basis for the
introduction of a variety of procedures and tech-
9 With vertical representation, a single prosecutor han-
dles each case rather than passing the same case to
different prosecutors.
niques that eventually will improve the functioning
of an entire office. While the short-term benefits
may be difficult to assess, the long-term benefits of
responsiveness to public concerns may be consid-
erable.
CONCLUSION
Career criminal prosecution and the activities it
encompasses are a self-declared success. Most pros-
ecutors who have established such units defend
their merits. Nothing the evaluators say is likely to
change these sentiments. However, as time passes,
the career criminal program concept will continue
to evolve. Selection criteria will be modified and
new procedures will be tested. It would behoove
those prosecutors who are involved to be able to
articulate the long-term objectives of their pro-
grams, in order to guide their subordinates and to
defend their program.
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